Mali’s security crisis: should sahelian states negotiate with jihadists?

The coordinated assaults on April 25 and 26 targeting key Malian cities like Bamako, Kati, Gao, Sévaré, and Kidal have brought a long-standing, sensitive issue back into Mali’s security discourse: the possibility of engaging in dialogue with jihadist factions. Given the significant scale of the joint offensive by the Jnim (Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin), an Al-Qaeda affiliate, and the Tuareg insurgents of the Front de libération de l’Azawad (FLA), many analysts and experts now suggest that a purely military approach is proving insufficient.

The offensive rapidly spread across Mali, from its northern regions to the south, at an unprecedented pace. Armed groups launched multiple synchronized attacks against military forces and government symbols in at least six urban centers, reaching as far as the outskirts of Bamako. This marked the first overtly visible instance of Jnim and the FLA collaborating. The FLA, established in November 2024 following the disbandment of the Cadre stratégique permanent (CSP), advocates for the self-determination of Azawad, a significant territory in northern Mali.

These recent assaults starkly revealed the Malian regime’s fragility. Neither the junta led by Assimi Goïta nor its Russian partners from Africa Corps appear capable of halting the armed groups’ advance. Regional media outlets and diplomatic circles are increasingly discussing the prospect of negotiations with Jnim, against a backdrop of Bamako’s gradual strangulation and deepening regional instability. However, the junta publicly dismisses any notion of dialogue. Bamako maintains its stance of rejecting “any dialogue with armed terrorist groups,” adhering to a strictly military strategy despite the rapidly deteriorating security landscape.

Nevertheless, pressure on the regime has intensified since late April. Violence is escalating across the country’s central regions. Just last Friday, several villages in the Bankass area, including Kouroude and Dougara, came under attack. Local and security sources indicate that the combined death toll from Wednesday’s and Friday’s assaults ranges from 70 to 80 fatalities.

An unprecedented alliance, a critical warning

Jnim remains the primary driver of jihadist activity across the Sahel, particularly in Mali, but also extending into Burkina Faso and Niger. For the military juntas forming the Alliance des États du Sahel (AES), the predicament is tightening. These regimes, which ascended to power pledging to restore security, are struggling to curb an ever-expanding threat. In Mali, for nearly a year, these attacks have steadily encroached closer to the capital.

“From July 2025, jihadists launched attacks in western Mali, targeting gold panning and industrial sites. They then focused on the Bamako-Dakar corridor, effectively suffocating the capital,” Alain Antil, director of the Ifri’s Sub-Saharan Africa Center, observed. Héni Nsaibia of Acled further analyzed, “This time, what’s striking isn’t just the operation’s scale, but also the deliberate selection of targets. Kati and Bamako represent the regime’s core.”

The demise of Defense Minister Sadio Camara in Kati significantly rattled the authorities. Concurrently, the loss of Kidal – recaptured in late 2023 and hailed as a substantial victory – represents a major strategic setback.

The strategy of suffocation

Even prior to this recent offensive, numerous experts had noted an evolution in Jnim’s operational strategy. Alain Antil had previously explained, “There’s a clear intent to establish a stronger power dynamic, not only through security pressure but also to compel Malian authorities to engage in negotiations.”

The jihadist organization now aims to replicate nationally the tactics it has refined locally: economic blockades, the gradual encirclement of urban centers, and exerting pressure on vital logistical routes. The researcher emphasized, “Jnim is attempting to sustain an economic blockade around Bamako.”

According to Abdel Nasser Ould Ethmane Elyessa, this strategy is a long-term endeavor: “They have opted to weaken the government from within, favoring a strategy of attrition and exploiting vulnerabilities within the military system.” He further noted, “The Jnim no longer posits the implementation of Sharia law as a precondition for peace and now expresses openness to negotiation.”

Within this complex environment, the ongoing rivalry with the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS) introduces another layer of instability, as each faction strives to expand its territorial control and influence.

A taboo option gains traction

Officially, Sahelian governments reject any notion of dialogue. Alain Antil observed, “For the leaders of the AES, political negotiation is not considered. The rhetoric remains militaristic, with a military response as the sole option.”

However, the reality on the ground is more intricate. Abuses perpetrated by state forces and their allies have severely eroded public trust. Between January 2024 and March 2025, approximately 1,500 civilians were killed by government forces and their Russian partners in Mali, a figure nearly five times higher than those attributed to Jnim, according to the GI-TOC. This cycle of violence fuels resentment and inadvertently aids jihadist recruitment efforts.

States must commit to a brave compromise.

Abdel Nasser Ould Ethmane Elyessa, Sahel specialist researcher

Confronted with this stalemate, a growing number of experts are advocating for a paradigm shift. Alain Antil of Ifri believes, “The military option, in isolation, is a dead end when dealing with the jihadist phenomenon in the Sahel. It must be integrated with political negotiations.” Some grievances articulated by jihadist groups – such as corruption, demands for justice, and access to resources – could potentially serve as a foundation for discussions, without overlooking their inherent violence.

Abdel Nasser Ould Ethmane Elyessa takes this perspective further: “States must commit to a brave compromise. The idea would be to integrate jihadists into the political process to expose their limitations.” However, he establishes clear red lines: “The principle of gender equality and the secular nature of the state are non-negotiable.”

As jihadist offensives intensify, the concept of negotiation is transitioning from a heresy to a viable political consideration. For many Malian experts, the pertinent question is no longer whether to engage in dialogue, but rather how long Bamako can realistically continue to resist it.