The violent clashes between the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahel (EI-S) near Tessit on October 9, 2026, have exposed a harsh reality: armed groups continue to operate and fight for territorial control in areas that the military juntas of the Sahel claim to have secured. These confrontations, marked by dueling narratives of victory, underscore a critical flaw in the Alliance of Sahel States’ (AES) security strategy.

Contradictory narratives and ground realities in Tessit

On the morning of October 9, 2026, fierce fighting erupted in the Tessit region, near the Burkina Faso border, between JNIM and EI-S. Sources aligned with JNIM reported a significant defeat for the rival group, claiming territorial losses across multiple fronts. Conversely, EI-S-aligned sources asserted a decisive victory, asserting control over new zones previously contested by JNIM.

These competing claims leave the true outcome of the clashes uncertain. However, one undeniable truth emerges: the presence of armed groups in the Sahel remains unabated, and civilians bear the brunt of the resulting insecurity, displacement, and economic disruption.

Why do militant groups persist despite AES counterterrorism efforts?

The persistence of armed groups on territories claimed by the AES comprising Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger contradicts the juntas’ central justification for their rule: restoring security and sovereignty. Since seizing power, the military governments have framed their governance as a bulwark against terrorism. Yet, the ongoing violence and territorial disputes reveal the limitations of their strategies.

The core issue is not merely the existence of militant groups but the inability of the Sahel states to dismantle their operational bases or prevent their resurgence. The Tessit clashes serve as a stark illustration of this failure. While JNIM and EI-S battle for dominance, civilians remain trapped in a cycle of violence that shows no signs of abating, despite repeated promises of restored order.

The AES has repeatedly accused regional actors of harboring militants or providing safe havens. While such claims warrant scrutiny, none can substitute for tangible proof. The mere presence of armed groups within a nation’s borders does not inherently implicate its leadership in their activities.

Sovereignty in action: beyond rhetoric and into results

The military governments of the Sahel have positioned their shift away from Western partners and toward alliances with Russia as a decisive move to reclaim security. Yet, this reorientation has not translated into a decline in militant activity. The United Nations reported in 2026 that both JNIM and EI-S continued to operate across key regions, including Tessit, Menaka in Mali, and parts of Niger and Burkina Faso. Territorial disputes between these groups remain a persistent threat.

This reality undermines narratives that blame external interference as the sole driver of insecurity. While cross-border dynamics and regional factors contribute to the crisis, they cannot absolve governments of their responsibility to deliver on the ground.

The political cost of unmet security promises

Persistent insecurity raises a pressing political question: to what extent is the threat of terrorism being used to justify the extension of military rule and the indefinite postponement of a return to civilian governance? While it is untenable to suggest that the AES leadership actively shelters militants to maintain power, the absence of measurable security gains fuels skepticism about their long-term strategy.

The distinction between political exploitation and active sponsorship of insecurity is critical. Accusations must be substantiated with verifiable evidence; otherwise, they risk degenerating into unfounded speculation. However, the consequences of prolonged instability displacement, economic stagnation, and erosion of public trust are undeniable.

What the people of Tessit demand: action, not excuses

In Tessit, the dueling claims of JNIM and EI-S victory obscure the immediate and tangible consequences for local residents. The instability disrupts daily life, cripples economic activity, and restricts access to essential services. Rhetoric about sovereignty and international alliances offers no solace to those living under the shadow of violence.

The governments of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger face a clear mandate: to demonstrate their capacity to protect civilians, dismantle militant strongholds, and restore functional public administration in contested zones. Sovereignty is not measured by the allies one chooses or the foreign forces one expels; it is measured by the government’s ability to ensure the safety and prosperity of its people.

Until the AES can provide lasting security, the insurgency in the Sahel will remain a stain on its legitimacy and a burden on those it purports to serve.

By Boureima Amadou — Journaliste / Rédacteur

By Boureima Amadou — Journaliste / Rédacteur