Supply routes to Mali face major disruptions from Sénégal, Maroc, and Guinée

The difficulties plaguing several supply corridors serving Mali are starting to reshape the habits of regional transporters. Behind calls to suspend certain trips and the fears voiced by professional organisations, the disruptions on trade routes are now driving up freight costs, extending delivery times, and complicating the logistics chains linking Bamako to its main commercial partners.

As a landlocked country, Mali relies heavily on regional road transport. The Dakar-Bamako corridor remains a primary gateway for Malian imports. In 2024, roughly 2.6 million tonnes of goods destined for Mali passed through the port of Dakar, underlining the economic weight of this axis for the country’s supply. Security concerns are now translating into concrete decisions by hauliers. In Sénégal, the Union of Road Transporters reports that at least eleven Senegalese trucks operating on Mali routes have been set on fire in recent weeks. Professional organisations have urged drivers to reduce or suspend certain journeys, arguing that the risks are becoming economically unsustainable.

The events of May 6 heightened these worries. Several commercial convoys were attacked on the route linking the Mauritanian border to Bamako. According to Moroccan union officials, more than fifteen trucks from Maroc, Sénégal, and Mauritanie were targeted by armed groups. At least six Moroccan heavy goods vehicles were burned.

That incident also had repercussions in Maroc, where many road transport operators are now much more cautious about Mali services. For transport companies, the calculations are shifting rapidly: higher insurance premiums, vehicle immobilisation, increased security costs, and more detours are cutting into margins on routes that were already long and expensive.

The Guinée-Mali corridor is no longer spared from disruptions. Since the attacks reported on this major trade artery at the end of April, the movement of goods and passengers has slowed significantly. Yet this route plays an important role in diversifying Mali’s logistics, especially via the port of Conakry. The problems on this road limit the alternatives available when other corridors come under strain.

The consequences now go far beyond transport companies alone. On several axes, drivers are extending their waiting times before departure, some convoys travel in groups, and families go days without news of relatives on the road. For economic operators, each interruption increases storage costs, delays deliveries, and slows cross-border trade. When multiple corridors are simultaneously disrupted, it is the supply of the Malian market, regional logistics timelines, and transborder economic activity that directly suffer the effects of these difficulties.

Three years after the security reorientation undertaken by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger—marked by a distancing from several Western partners and a stronger rapprochement with Russia—security challenges continue to weigh on the Sahel. These security issues are now increasingly affecting regional trade and traffic on major commercial axes. The repercussions are felt well beyond the borders of the Sahel States Alliance: transport organisations in Sénégal, Moroccan operators, and Mauritanian carriers are expressing serious concerns about the risks on certain Malian roads.