Algeria’s diplomatic push in Sahel counters Morocco’s growing influence

After fifteen months of strained relations with Bamako, Algiers has restored full diplomatic ties with Mali and reopened its airspace to Malian aircraft. With Niamey, the rapprochement has deepened further, marked by the delivery of four military helicopters, renewed oil projects, and joint crude oil marketing. Behind these moves—timed as Morocco strengthens its ties with the Alliance of Sahel States—lies a shared Algerian concern: regaining lost influence south of its borders before Rabat turns its economic and diplomatic foothold into lasting political advantage.

Over recent weeks, the momentum has become unmistakable. Following an unprecedented confrontation with Bamako, Algeria took decisive steps to restore relations: on July 10, President Abdelmadjid Tebboune ordered the return of Ambassador Kamal Retieb to Mali, while Bamako simultaneously announced the reinstatement of its ambassador to Algiers and the reopening of its airspace to Algerian civilian and military aircraft. This normalization, after fifteen months of crisis, took on new significance in early August when Malian Prime Minister Abdoulaye Maïga spoke of a «total convergence of views» between Assimi Goïta and Abdelmadjid Tebboune, particularly on «respect for state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs». For Algiers, the significance extends beyond bilateral repair: Mali is its key Saharan neighbor, the political core of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), and the country whose rupture most starkly exposed Algeria’s fading diplomatic clout in the region. Restoring dialogue with Bamako signals a deliberate effort to rebuild influence piece by piece.

Nowhere is this shift more evident than in Niger. On August 9, Algeria delivered four helicopters to Niamey—two Mi-24V combat units and two Mi-171 transport choppers—alongside spare parts, maintenance equipment, and ammunition. Days later, Algeria’s prime minister traveled to Niamey to inaugurate drilling at the Kafra Sud-Est 1 exploration well, just as Sonatrach and Niger’s state petroleum company (Sonidep) announced their first joint crude oil marketing operation. In rapid succession, Algiers combined military support, hydrocarbon development, and economic cooperation—three pillars intended to restore its strategic depth south of its borders. The rapprochement with Niamey is no longer just diplomatic; it is now tangible through material commitments in security, energy, and trade.

Sahel states become battlegrounds for diplomatic influence

This acceleration comes amid a transformed regional landscape. The three AES member states—Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger—have severed ties with Western partners, expanded cooperation with Russia, and begun building their own frameworks for diplomatic, economic, and military collaboration. In June, their foreign ministers met in Bamako to operationalize the «Diplomacy pillar» of the Confederation and define a unified approach. For Algeria, this new reality presents both a challenge to its historical sway and an opportunity to regain footing with governments that, having cut ties with Paris and other Western capitals, are actively seeking new alliances. Yet the arrival of a third major player has intensified the stakes: Morocco, which has entrenched itself across the Sahel using a distinct playbook—blending political diplomacy, religious outreach, investment, infrastructure, and Atlantic-facing initiatives.

The rivalry with Rabat lends Algeria’s return its true significance—revealing it as essentially reactive. The Institute for Security Studies noted in March that Algeria’s economic diplomacy is aimed at «safeguarding regional influence against Moroccan advances». The International Crisis Group had earlier warned in late 2024 that «Morocco has capitalized on Algeria’s declining influence in the Sahel». The crux of Algeria’s dilemma lies here: despite its formidable military strength and energy revenues, these assets have not translated into commensurate political influence. Morocco, by contrast, has methodically woven a web of interests spanning banking, telecommunications, fertilizers, religious education, and infrastructure. While Rabat builds durable interdependencies, Algiers appears focused on preventing its neighbor from converting its own setbacks into diplomatic gains. Observers describe Algeria’s current policy as a counteroffensive—one aimed not at expansion, but at clawing back lost ground and containing Morocco’s rise.

Reconciliation with Bamako proves pivotal

The normalization with Mali stands out as the most consequential development of the year for Algiers. For fifteen months, the two countries had been locked in confrontation—one that appeared to have permanently shattered the uneasy partnership once built on Algeria’s mediation role. The crisis erupted after Bamako rejected the 2015 peace accord and escalated further in April 2025 when the Algerian military destroyed a Malian drone near Tinzaouaten. Bamako accused Algiers of aggression; Algiers countered that the aircraft had violated its airspace. All three AES members withdrew their ambassadors, and the rupture deepened when Bamako took the case to the International Court of Justice while Algiers contested the court’s jurisdiction.

The July 10 decision to restore ties marked a major reversal. Bamako announced the return of its ambassador to Algiers and the reopening of its airspace, while Algiers reciprocated by reinstating its envoy in Bamako. Within weeks, the tone had shifted further: Mali’s reference to a «total convergence of views» with Algiers suggested the normalization transcended mere administrative repair. It offered Algeria a chance to re-engage in discussions on Sahel security and the region’s political future. Analysts noted that Niamey—itself closely aligned with Algiers—played a facilitative role in the rapprochement between the two capitals.

Niger emerges as Algeria’s strategic testing ground

The Niger case more clearly illustrates Algeria’s chosen method. As early as March, the second session of the high-level Algerian-Nigerien joint commission addressed energy, security, transport, health, finance, and infrastructure. Both governments labeled their relationship «strategically irreversible» and announced a «completely renewed partnership». Since then, commitments have multiplied: the military helicopter transfer represents the most visible security component, while the launch of the Kafra Sud-Est 1 drilling project and the first joint oil marketing operation give the partnership a tangible economic dimension—though these initiatives still face real-world tests.

This strategy responds to both geographic necessity and political urgency. Algeria shares over 1,300 kilometers of border with Mali and a long frontier with Niger—two countries grappling with armed groups across the Sahel. The deterioration of their security is not merely a regional issue for Algiers; it is an internal concern. Yet security alone cannot sustain influence. Algeria must now deploy economic and energy instruments capable of rivaling those deployed by Morocco. The Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline, hydrocarbon projects, infrastructure development, and now military equipment form the building blocks of this return.

Morocco’s lead remains difficult to overcome

Algeria’s challenge is that Morocco did not wait for its return—and several of Rabat’s advances are precisely the kind Algiers failed to prevent. On April 10, Mali withdrew its recognition of the self-proclaimed Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and declared support for «Morocco’s autonomy plan as the only serious and credible basis». Meanwhile, all three AES states have steadily expanded their ties with the kingdom. For Algiers, this evolution strikes at the heart of the Morocco-Algeria rivalry: beyond Sahel influence, the contest now revolves around which nation can rally African capitals to its position on Western Sahara. Cornered, Algeria appears determined to regain ground wherever Rabat has advanced, to reclaim lost positions, and to prevent its rival from reaping political dividends. Its current approach is less about conquering new space than about frustrating Morocco’s ability to exploit Algeria’s past missteps.

A fragile recovery in the making

The current phase reveals a catch-up strategy driven by lost influence. After ceding its role as mediator in Mali, Algiers is returning through bilateral ties, hydrocarbons, infrastructure, and security. Niger has become the most advanced laboratory of this policy, while Mali—with restored ambassadors and air links—serves as its major diplomatic test. Burkina Faso completes the framework, though relations with Ouagadougou remain less visible. This recovery is largely about clawing back former positions and preventing them from benefiting Rabat. The obsession with Moroccan competition narrows Algeria’s approach: influence is measured more by what Morocco loses than by what Algeria delivers. A power seeking lasting influence in the region must offer its own vision—not merely react to its neighbor’s moves.