Over recent weeks, initiatives have multiplied across West Africa to rebuild dialogue and consultation channels between ECOWAS countries and those of the Alliance of Sahel States — Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger. At the core of these delicate approaches lies the security question and the need to establish common policies that allow, as much as possible, a harmonisation of actions while awaiting the sacred goal of pooling resources. To give this urgent diplomacy its best chance, the actors involved must observe several tacit requirements: sidestep the dispute over the withdrawal of the three AES states from ECOWAS; overlook the resentment generated by hostile communication campaigns from AES regimes against certain regional countries; and move beyond the consequences of geopolitical restructuring in the Sahel, which have, among other effects, created a cold war climate between the AES and ECOWAS. In short, the aim is to silence grudges, overcome tensions and inappropriate displays of pride, so as to face the common challenges of the hour.

Côte d’Ivoire ready to resume cooperation

Among the strongest signals of this turn are recent statements by Côte d’Ivoire’s defence minister, Tene Birahima Ouattara. On 15 June, he expressed sincere readiness to resume security cooperation with Mali and Burkina Faso, arguing that terrorism, as it currently manifests, cannot be defeated by a single state. Collaboration and pooling of forces are necessary, he stated — an obvious truth worth repeating at a time when some decision-makers warn that the consequences of the security crisis in the Sahel could become untenable in the medium term for the entire region.

How will Mali and Burkina Faso respond to this call from Côte d’Ivoire? For now, nothing suggests a collective surge of lucidity among all concerned actors to jointly produce solutions to the urgent issues. Even if the leaders of Mali and Burkina Faso acknowledge that the break with ECOWAS does not preclude bilateral cooperation, it remains difficult for them to suddenly shift their stance toward the Ivorian interlocutor. Regularly accused of hosting terrorist elements funded or sponsored by French imperialism, Côte d’Ivoire is one of the privileged targets of the AES’s external — even imaginary — enemy factory. Although these accusations have never been backed by facts or any evidence, they are part of the doctrinal narrative of regimes born from the coups that led to their withdrawal from ECOWAS. Yet, despite these poisonous diplomatic relations, Côte d’Ivoire maintains discreet channels of exchange and cooperation with Mali and Burkina Faso, whose nationals enjoy refugee status by the thousands on Ivorian soil.

New era for Benin and Niger

Benin, also targeted by the same accusations, has seen its new president, Romuald Wadagni, initiate gestures of rapprochement and appeasement with AES countries shortly after his inauguration on 24 May. Special mention goes to Niger, whose common border with Benin has remained closed since the aftermath of the July 2023 coup in Niamey. While all dialogue had become impossible between the two countries, the arrival of a new leader in Benin served as an opportunity to end what had turned into a vulgar personal quarrel between Nigerien military authorities and former Beninese president Patrice Talon.

The change of face at the helm of Benin has thus acted as an accelerator of reconciliation between these two neighbours. In this context, an experts’ meeting between Nigerien and Beninese officials took place in Cotonou on 20 and 21 June, aiming to draft the terms of a new cooperation focused mainly on defence, security, and conditions for reopening the common border — a decisive factor for resuming economic activity between Benin and Niger. On this last point, the Nigerien delegation emphasised its wish to obtain more information about the alleged presence of foreign elements at the Benin-Niger border. This request echoes the stubborn suspicion voiced by Niamey’s military rulers that Benin hosts a French military base intended to destabilise Niger or finance terrorism. An accusation that defies common sense: why would Benin finance terrorism when it itself is a target and victim of it? Such statements have become routine narrative for AES regimes struggling to curb the continuous deterioration of security on their own territories. Their promise to unite military means to fight terrorism has not moved beyond rhetoric. Today, large swaths of Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso have become grey zones administered by armed terrorist groups, whose expansion the ruling juntas cannot contain.

The hour of reconciliation between Niger and Benin has thus arrived. According to Niger’s interior and security minister, Mohamed Toumba, a new era is opening for both countries. He stated that by choosing dialogue over confrontation, they have created value for their economies and security for their populations. Nigerien and Beninese actors are not losing sight of the fact that behind the security challenge lies the equally crucial economic one, in a space where people share intertwined destinies. As we witness a return to realist and pragmatic diplomacy, what is happening between Benin and Niger looks like a textbook case or a pilot event for a reassessed and intelligent management of shared vulnerabilities across the West African common space.

Endogenous responses to the security crisis

Initiatives aimed at normalising relations between ECOWAS and AES countries should become even more defined in the coming months. Besides reactivating the logic of neighbourliness that has prevailed in this region for decades, they underline the urgency of endogenous responses to the security equation. This echoes recommendations made last year by UN secretary-general António Guterres for a resumption of dialogue among all West African countries. In December 2025, Russia, a privileged partner of AES countries, sent the first signals of a diplomatic recalibration in West Africa by calling for continued pragmatic and mutually beneficial dialogue between ECOWAS and the AES, so as to find common solutions to counter shared challenges and threats, including the fight against regional terrorism. These remarks indicate a paradigm shift in international cooperation — a way of reminding Africans that it is up to them alone to craft the most efficient solutions to their current challenges.

Already, bilateral relational protocols are observed between the AES and certain countries such as Ghana, Guinea, Togo, and Senegal. Despite their withdrawal from ECOWAS, the Sahelian military regimes have maintained their presence in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), and their nationals continue to benefit from the principle of free movement within the ECOWAS space. Ultimately, one must question the justification for the AES promoters’ exit from the regional community. The only available answer leads back to the original dispute: ECOWAS’s condemnation of the coups in AES countries, and above all the refusal of the leaders of that entity to work toward restoring constitutional order. In many respects, the break between the AES and ECOWAS resembles an artificial or unfinished divorce.