Question: Since the April 25 attacks, opponents of the transition regime claim the authorities are weakened. Meanwhile, supporters of the military leadership urge unity. For you, does President Assimi Goïta remain the leader Mali needs?

Moussa Ag Acharatoumane: Absolutely. Assimi Goïta is still the president Mali requires. He continues to govern the country effectively. I must emphasize that despite the April 25 attacks, Mali stands firm as a nation capable of action. Our defense and security forces have repelled terrorist attempts, despite the complexity of the assaults and the presence of internal and external accomplices. Today, our army is more united than ever—commanders and troops share a strong bond, morale is high, and operations are ongoing nationwide.

Attacks by armed groups persist, Bamako faces a blockade, yet the regime remains resilient and ready to confront these challenges.

The regime is resilient, and I would go further: it is the Malian people themselves who demonstrate resilience today. Malians love their army, their government, and their country. The alliance between Jnim jihadists and FLA separatists is a serious misstep. Those who have chosen to align with al-Qaeda have failed to learn from history. In 2012, a similar attempt unfolded, with devastating consequences witnessed globally. Some within these groups remain trapped in al-Qaeda’s web, while others—including former leaders—have suffered immensely, with their families decimated by the organization. The same al-Qaeda responsible for the 2013 assassination of journalists Ghislain Dupont and Claude Verlon in Kidal continues to operate today, with some of its key figures now leading Jnim.

What are your thoughts on the Jnim-FLA alliance?

This alliance is a grave error. Our brothers must recognize their mistake and reverse course. They should follow the example of the MSA and Gatia—two politico-military groups allied with the transitional authorities—which have joined forces with the Malian army to combat international terrorism.

FLA leaders insist this is merely a military alliance against a common enemy—the Malian army and the Africa Corps—and that no broader shared agenda exists.

When al-Qaeda’s official international organ acknowledges its alliance with the FLA, when Iyad Ag Ghali—Jnim’s leader—coordinates operations alongside Alghabass Ag Intallah in Kidal, and when they parade through the streets with black flags symbolizing their extremist project, it is clear our brothers are mistaken. They were victims of these forces in 2012, and the same actors persist in 2026.

Jnim and the FLA now control Kidal and Tessalit, while the Malian army and Russian Africa Corps maintain positions in Aguelhoc and Anéfis. Can we expect a counteroffensive in the Kidal region?

Our defense and security forces are reorganizing and remain active in the Kidal region. They are determined to conduct operations across the entire national territory and will not cede a single inch to terrorist groups.

General El Hadj Ag Gamou, appointed governor of Kidal by the transitional authorities in 2023, is reportedly in Gao. Is this accurate? Could he play a role in a potential counteroffensive in Kidal?

General El Hadj Ag Gamou is in excellent health and spirits. He remains the governor of the Kidal region, focused on his duties. The army is handling offensives, reorganization, redeployment, and operations. His role is to govern, and he is fulfilling it well.

In your region of Ménaka, the Malian army and Russian Africa Corps repelled ISIS offensives in late April. How would you describe the situation in the city today?

Currently, the situation is under control. Normal life has resumed, the administration is functioning, and security forces, along with their partners, conduct regular patrols. However, the threat remains real. We must stay vigilant—we are at war with one of the world’s most dangerous terrorist organizations. For now, Ménaka is calm, but we cannot afford to be complacent.

Dialogue and negotiation with Jnim and the FLA are advocated by some opposition figures, such as Imam Dicko’s Coalition of Republican Forces. Yet for over a decade, this has been a recurring recommendation in national consultations, including during the Transition. The current authorities firmly reject this approach. Do you support such negotiations?

There is no room for negotiation with groups whose sole objective is the destruction of our nation. The Malian state protects its people and territorial integrity, and under no circumstances will it engage in talks with these factions unless they abandon their extremist ideologies and agendas. If they reconsider their stance, there may be a place for dialogue—but not under the current conditions.