How Burundi and Mali’s authoritarian regimes use external threats for power

On April 20, 2026, General Évariste Ndayishimiye undertook an official “friendship and working” visit to Ouagadougou. At the time, the Burundian head of state held the rotating chairmanship of the African Union (AU).

This diplomatic initiative aimed to re-establish dialogue between the continental organization and the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). This alliance, comprising Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, is currently led by Captain Ibrahim Traoré.

The visit occurred amidst the withdrawal of AES member states from AU bodies. During his trip to Burkina Faso, a nation governed by a military junta, the Burundian president commended efforts to restore security and stabilize the country, where its leader has openly declared democracy is no longer relevant. This raises a critical question about African governance.

Beyond the diplomatic rhetoric of “dialogue” and “stability,” does this not reveal a form of solidarity among authoritarian regimes that share a common rejection of constitutional constraints?

An analysis of international sanctions (from the European Union and regional organizations) and authoritarian resilience in fragile states, particularly Burundi, Mali, and Niger, highlights the political resources these nations leverage to withstand external pressures. This comparative study reveals common strategies across the continent.

Converging trajectories in African governance

Indeed, Burundi shares a convergence of institutional trajectories with the AES states. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have faced sanctions from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the European Union (EU) following military coups in 2020 and 2021 in Mali, 2022 in Burkina Faso, and 2023 in Niger.

Burundi itself was sanctioned by the EU and the United States in 2016, a response to President Pierre Nkurunziza’s decision to seek a third term deemed unconstitutional. Such political phenomena necessitate a trans-regional comparative approach, not merely to identify superficial resemblances, but to uncover deep, convergent logics at play. This is particularly evident in the rapprochement between Burundi and Mali, two countries separated by thousands of kilometers and distinct geopolitical environments.

The strategic designation of an enemy

In both Burundi and Mali, the identification of an enemy, whether internal or external, serves as a central mechanism for legitimacy and a powerful driver of internal cohesion. This strategy allows for the constant re-activation of a perceived threat, adapting to political circumstances—be it a colonial adversary, a regional rival, or a diffuse security threat.

In Mali, this mechanism intensified significantly in early 2022. Fueled by a “rally around the flag” effect, where the populace unites behind leaders in the face of an external or perceived threat, the Malian government saw its authority strengthened. Supported by a civilian component in the second phase of the transition following the May 2021 putsch, the military leadership garnered massive popular backing.

Tens of thousands of demonstrators converged on Boulevard de l’Indépendance on January 14, 2022, to protest economic and diplomatic sanctions imposed by ECOWAS. They vociferously expressed hostility towards Paris and the regional organization, accusing them of interfering in the nation’s affairs. Protesters also demanded a Mali solely for its citizens, free from foreign influence.

In Burundi, Belgium became the focal point of anger for supporters of the ruling party, the Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie – Forces de défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD). Designated as historically responsible for ethnic divisions within the country, the former colonial power is also accused of complicity with Rwanda in attempts to destabilize the incumbent regime. The Burundian government, led by the CNDD-FDD, portrays Brussels as the instigator of EU economic sanctions—a narrative that allows both regimes to deflect international criticism by framing it as resistance against former colonizers.

Selecting a regional adversary

Regionally, each regime also strategically chooses an adversary. In Mali, Algeria stands accused of harboring opposition figures like Imam Mahmoud Dicko and of colluding with active terrorist groups. The Malian junta announced on January 25, 2024, the “immediate termination” of the Algiers peace agreement. Mali also closed its airspace to Algeria, following a similar measure taken by Algeria in April 2025.

In Burundi, however, Paul Kagame’s Rwanda, a Tutsi-led regime, fulfills this adversarial role. Labeled a “bad neighbor” by President Ndayishimiye, Kigali is accused of sheltering plotters involved in the 2015 coup attempt. Burundian authorities also present Rwanda as a supporter of rebel movements such as RED-Tabara, sometimes linked to other armed groups in the region.

This defensive stance led to the closure of land borders with Rwanda in January 2024, as well as active military intervention in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo between August 2022 and December 2025. This intervention supported the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC), alongside Wazalendo militias (patriots in Kiswahili) and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), against the M23 Movement, which is reportedly backed by Kigali. These symbolic resources are mobilized to foster a permanent sense of siege—a necessary condition for the political survival of regimes that have made external threats their primary fuel.

The security paradox

A security paradox, however, distinguishes the two countries. In Mali, the threat is more immediate, evidenced by attacks on April 25, 2026, perpetrated by the FLA and JNIM. These attacks significantly bolster the regime’s security narrative, reinforcing its claims of being the sole protector of the nation.

This divergence in the nature of the threat leads to distinct legitimization strategies.

The head of the Malian junta, Assimi Goïta, has effectively bypassed electoral constraints. In July 2025, the National Transitional Council granted him a renewable five-year mandate without elections and without term limits, completing a trajectory initiated with the initial postponements of the ballot promised in March 2024. The junta no longer needs to legitimize a vote; instead, it positions itself as the sole bulwark capable of defeating JNIM and FLA—even as the Malian economy, though resilient, faces recurrent power outages and a gradual withdrawal of development and humanitarian aid.

In Burundi, the CNDD-FDD has nominated the incumbent president as its candidate for the 2027 presidential election, and the ballot, even if tightly controlled, remains a mandatory step.

The security record highlighted by Gitega, therefore, does not replace an election; rather, it aims to prepare for it. The security narrative allows the regime to relegate to the background an economic record marked by fuel and currency shortages that have plagued the country since 2015.

Considering both nations among the world’s poorest—with Burundi ranking last in 2023—does the constant externalization of blame through the construction of an enemy also mask internal predatory dynamics that structure authoritarian regimes, as per French political scientist Jean-François Bayart’s analytical framework?

Ultimately, the comparison between Mali and Burundi reveals less about the singularity of each trajectory and more about the robustness of a logic common to regimes that have transformed their enemies not into a burden, but into their very foundation for power and African governance.